The emergence of electronic communications networks in the U.S. equity markets by James McAndrews & Chris Stefanadis
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
IN ECONOMICS   AND FINANCE
The Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks
in the U.S. Equity Markets
James McAndrews and Chris Stefanadis
Recent regulatory and technological changes have spurred the development of automated trading
systems known as ECNs, or electronic communications networks. Proponents of the networks
contend that ECNs can cut transaction costs, accelerate trade execution, and expand the price
information available to investors. While some critics have questioned the effects of the ECNs
on market integration, it is clear that the networks are poised to play an increasingly important
role in the new electronic environment.
The U.S. equity markets are in the midst of a technologi-
cal revolution that could redefine their structure and
operation. In recent years, electronic communications
networks (ECNs)—innovative stock-trading systems that
rely on computer software to match buy and sell orders—
have developed rapidly and captured a sizable share of the
dollar volume of certain trades. The operators of the net-
works claim that ECNs can outperform traditional market
centers by providing faster trade execution, lower transac-
tion costs, and more complete price information.
ECNs first entered the equity markets in the mid-
1990s to display and communicate customer buy and
sell orders publicly. However, it soon became clear that
these networks could directly match orders and thereby
execute transactions in a manner similar to that of tradi-
tional stock exchanges. Today, ECNs are relying on
their technology to position themselves as automated
gateways to certain equity markets. Meanwhile, the
market centers themselves—faced with the growing
challenge of ECNs—have also been investing in and
incorporating increased levels of automation in their
trading systems.
In this edition of Current Issues, we offer an in-depth
look at electronic communications networks—their ori-
gins, their regulatory and technological implications,
and their diverse structures and strategies. We also
examine the future role of ECNs in the equity markets.
In particular, we consider the possibility that the effi-
ciencies provided by these networks will enable stock
trading to migrate from a single site, such as an
exchange floor, to highly interlinked market centers,
where orders flow quickly between centers in pursuit of
the best available prices.
The Evolution of ECNs
Over the past few years, an alternative to the conven-
tional equity trading arrangements (see box) has
emerged: the electronic communications network. An
ECN is an automated trading system that disseminates
orders to third parties and dealers and can execute such
orders within the network itself.1 Most ECNs are regu-
lated as brokers and, as brokers, they receive orders
from customers. ECNs typically do not serve individual
investors, but instead focus on other brokers and institu-
tional investors. The networks post the price and size of
limit orders—orders to buy or sell specific quantities of
stock at a specific price—received from clients and
automatically complete transactions internally when
they find appropriate matches. When an internal match
for a given order is not found, the ECNs post the order
on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation (Nasdaq) system as soon as it
becomes the network’s best bid or offer for a stock.
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Regulatory Developments
The rise of ECNs can be attributed in large part to cer-
tain regulatory actions that helped create a favorable
environment for the networks’ entry into the equity
markets.
In the Nasdaq system, each dealer in a stock
announces a bid and an offer: prices at which the dealer
is willing to buy and sell the stock. Before 1994, a
dealer could ignore public limit orders, refusing to exe-
cute an order that put forward a better price than the
dealer presented. In the absence of direct competition
from public limit orders, dealers could potentially post
lower bid or higher offer prices for stocks, earning
excess profits at the expense of investors.
However, in a series of rules that culminated in the
1997 order display rule, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ensured that dealers took public limit
orders into full account. The rules give a dealer three
possible courses of action: limit orders must be fully
reflected in the dealer’s quote, the orders must be imme-
diately executed against the dealer’s inventory, or they
must be forwarded to another dealer or ECN. The rules
have thus led to greater transparency and heightened
interaction of limit orders—an outcome that in turn has
spurred the development of ECNs, whose liquidity is
based largely on limit-order flow.2
More important, the Securities and Exchange
Commission gave ECNs complete access to the Nasdaq
in 1997. Before then, dealers sometimes placed on pro-
prietary systems orders that were better priced than
their quotes in the public market. These systems gave
very little price information to the public. In 1997, how-
ever, the commission adopted its quote rule, which
requires dealers to display publicly their most competi-
tive quotes. The rule prevents a dealer from placing a
more competitive quote in an ECN unless the price is
viewable by, and accessible to, all market participants.
Together, the order display and quote rules helped to
end ECN privacy, effectively inducing the networks to
post their quotes on the Nasdaq. Opening the Nasdaq to
ECNs proved to be a crucial step in their evolution: a
network with such access needs to provide only one
party to a transaction; the counterparty can come from
anywhere else in the system. By contrast, a proprietary
In the United States, equity shares are traded in stock
exchanges as well as in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. In
organized exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange, buyers and sell-
ers of securities meet in one central location to execute trades.
In the OTC market, dealers at various locations trade shares
of a stock with anyone who accepts their price. The OTC mar-
ket is organized by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), which arranges trades mainly through its
Nasdaq automated quotation system.
The New York Stock Exchange
The NYSE is the largest organized stock exchange in the
United States. Its 1,366 members represent three groups of
roughly equal size: commission brokers, independent bro-
kers, and specialists (Ip and Smith 1999). Trading on the
NYSE is structured around the specialist. For each stock, one
specialist has an exclusive franchise, functioning as both
agent and dealer. As agent, he or she matches buy and sell
orders and handles limit orders placed with brokers. The spe-
cialist therefore maintains the limit-order book, which
records all of the unexecuted limit orders received. As dealer,
the specialist sometimes posts his or her own price quotes on
the market and trades from his or her own inventory, provid-
ing liquidity when the normal order flow is inadequate.
The NYSE has an electronic transmission system for
small orders—SuperDot—through which member firms
can place market orders for up to 2,099 shares or limit
orders for up to 30,099 shares. SuperDot delivers 85 percent
of all NYSE orders (Reilly and Brown 1997). Orders are
executed manually by the specialist. The specialist’s limit-
order book contains proprietary information to which bro-
kers have very limited access.
The Over-the-Counter Market
The OTC market mainly involves trading in stocks not listed
on an exchange. All purchases and sales of shares occur
through a dealer. Thus, a broker with access to the Nasdaq
system can identify the dealer with the best quote before
making a sale or purchase. In January 2000, there were
approximately eleven dealers for each Nasdaq stock
(Nasdaq 2000a). This multiple-dealer structure is a key
feature distinguishing the OTC market from the NYSE and
its single-specialist structure.
In the over-the-counter market, brokers can route
orders to NASD dealers through a telephone line or by
using either the Small Order Execution System or
SelectNet. The Small Order Execution System automati-
cally executes orders of less than 1,000 shares at the best
price available on the Nasdaq. SelectNet allows dealers to
negotiate the terms of large orders with other dealers. As
in a traditional exchange, a dealer’s limit-order book gen-
erally contains proprietary information not available to
individual investors.
The U.S. Equity Marketssystem needs to attract both a buyer and a seller to com-
plete a transaction.
Technological Advances
ECNs have also evolved naturally from the major
advances in telecommunications and computer technology
in recent years. After the boom experienced by on-line
brokerage and financial services firms, the development
of ECNs appeared to be an obvious next step. Since 1997,
several ECNs have entered the market, seizing the oppor-
tunities created by technological (and regulatory) change.3
Today, the networks capture approximately 26 percent of
the dollar volume of Nasdaq trading, but some practition-
ers predict that their market share could rise to 50 percent
over the next few years (Nasdaq 2000a).
Such a rise could stem largely from four technologi-
cal advantages potentially offered by ECNs. First, their
automated communication and matching systems could
lead to less expensive trade execution. By matching
buyers and sellers directly, the networks can bypass
dealers, saving on dealer rents and minimizing trading
costs. Dealers on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the Nasdaq have average operating mar-
gins of 55 percent and 25 percent, respectively (Vinzant
1999).4 ECNs offer the opportunity to undercut these
margins and reduce transaction costs. Indeed, since the
adoption of the Securities and Exchange Commission
rules in 1997, the average Nasdaq spread—the differ-
ence between the bid and offer price—has declined by
more than 40 percent (Nasdaq 2000b). The emergence
of ECNs has very likely contributed to the reduction in
trading costs (Weston 2000).
Swifter trade execution is another potential advan-
tage of ECNs. State-of-the-art technology generally
allows the networks to execute orders significantly
faster than the trading systems of established market
centers. For example, the average turnaround time for
an ECN-executed order is two to three seconds, com-
pared with twenty-two seconds for an order processed
through an exchange (Smith, Ip, and Gasparino 1999).
Furthermore, several ECNs provide investors with
more complete price information than traditional mar-
ket centers by allowing them to see the network limit-
order books. An investor with access to this information
is better positioned to assess market depth and to decide
how to place an order.
Finally, by listing only the price and size of an order,
rather than the trader’s identity, ECNs provide trader
anonymity. Anonymity is potentially important for
informed institutional investors, whose transactions
may serve as signals to less informed traders.
Anonymity also protects institutional investors against
front running, the practice of trading in front of an
investor when the trader possesses prior knowledge of an
upcoming transaction. In the equity markets, information
leakage and front running are serious concerns.5
ECN Strategies
ECNs distinguish themselves from each other by targeting
different clienteles and following different strategies. Some
networks, for example, handle limit orders exclusively and
are destination-only ECNs (that is, orders do not leave
the network until they are canceled). A destination-only
ECN conducts its own price discovery: when it receives
a limit order, it immediately searches for an internal
match in its order book; if a match is not found, the
ECN posts the order on the Nasdaq as soon as it
becomes the network’s best quote and waits for an out-
side party to express interest in trading at its price.
Other ECNs take both market orders—orders to buy or
sell a stock immediately at the best available price—and
limit orders and route them to the Nasdaq in search of the
optimal price. These outbound-routing ECNs actively
seek liquidity outside their networks: when the national
best bid or offer—the best price available in the entire
market—can be obtained from another dealer or network,
outbound-routing ECNs send their orders there.
Interestingly, destination-only ECNs often consider
outbound-routing networks some of their best customers.
ECNs also differentiate themselves in other ways.
For example, each ECN that routes orders to other market
centers has its own method (or algorithm) for selecting
the center that is likely to provide a particular combina-
tion of speed, quality, price, and certainty of execution.
Other ECNs batch orders for short periods and conduct
regular “call markets” to establish a stock price,6 while
still others engage in price discovery continuously.
Furthermore, ECNs vary in the type of information they
provide investors: some post their limit-order books on
the Internet, while others grant individual investors
more limited access to price information. These different
approaches to price discovery, quality of execution, and
order information are likely to attract diverse clients
with diverse trading needs.
ECNs Compared with Traditional Market Centers
Market participants continue to debate the advantages of
ECNs relative to those of traditional market centers.
Advocates of electronic communications networks argue
that they offer potentially lower transaction costs,
achieve faster execution, provide more information to
investors, and protect trader anonymity more efficiently.
However, proponents of the traditional market centers
contend that the existence of dealers and specialists
leads to greater liquidity. Dealers and specialists supply
immediacy by continuously standing ready to buy and sell
3using their own inventory. In contrast, in an automated
trading system, buyers and sellers arriving sporadically
might not find each other at once. Another advantage
cited by those favoring a dealer- or a specialist-centric
system is greater price stability. Experienced dealers can
often use their inventory to accommodate large orders
with minimal price impact. As some advocates of conven-
tional market centers point out, the dealer’s role is to provide
liquidity while investors provide liquidity only as a
by-product of portfolio trading. In addition, they note
that traditional exchanges may offer more precise price
discovery because all orders are funneled through the
specialist, thereby concentrating, rather than fragmenting,
order flow.
Nevertheless, for smaller orders and more active
stocks, it is debatable how much liquidity specialists and
dealers provide in modern equity markets. In active stock
trading, the flow of orders itself may be sufficient to sup-
ply liquidity. As a result, automated trading systems could
work well for active stocks, even in tumultuous environ-
ments. One market participant, for instance, observes that
specialists may not be needed to trade the 1,000 most
active NYSE stocks (Smith 1999). Rather, they may be
required only for the less liquid issues.
The Future of Electronic Communications Networks
Expansion Initiatives
Thus far, ECNs have been limited mainly to handling
shares traded over the counter (OTC) on the Nasdaq. Yet
despite being important players in the OTC market, the
networks account for only 4 percent of NYSE volume
(Vinzant 1999). Nevertheless, ECNs believe that they
maintain a technological edge, and have launched ambi-
tious expansion initiatives—some of which are aimed at
executing more transactions of exchange-traded stocks.
However, the current regulatory structure could poten-
tially thwart the efforts of ECNs to establish interconnec-
tions with established stock exchanges. Specifically,
equity markets in the United States were interlinked in the
late 1970s through a national market system that includes
the Consolidated Quotation System and the Intermarket
Trading System. The Consolidated Quotation System dis-
plays stock quotes in each participating market center;
brokers at one exchange can then commit to buy or sell
the stock at another exchange through the Intermarket
Trading System.
This arrangement poses two key problems for ECNs.
First, they can be linked to the intermarket system only
via the National Association of Securities Dealers’gate-
way to the network: the Computer Assisted Execution
System. Because this system interface was built for
dealers, it is not very suitable for pure matching engines
like ECNs. Second, ECNs consider the Intermarket
Trading System to be relatively slow, a drawback that
would prevent the networks from taking full advantage
of their advanced technology.
For these reasons, several ECNs have recently
applied to the Securities and Exchange Commission to
become full-fledged stock exchanges. Such a designa-
tion has several potential advantages. For one, as an
exchange, an ECN can become a self-regulatory organi-
zation. Currently, ECNs are subject to the regulatory
apparatus of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, with whose members many ECNs compete. In
addition, by becoming an exchange, an ECN would gain
unrestricted access to the Intermarket Trading System.
Furthermore, ECNs would have a say in the governance
of this system and could influence the direction of
investments in system improvements.
Competition from Incumbents
In the new technological environment, established
equity markets like the NYSE and Nasdaq are also
investing in enhanced electronic systems. In addition,
each has discussed becoming a shareholder-owned, for-
profit company (the two markets currently are member-
owned collectives).7
These developments have important implications.
First, analysts point out that the membership of the tra-
ditional market centers may be divided over the adop-
tion of newer automation (Dwyer 1999). Some mem-
bers, for example, may be reluctant to accept changes
that could eventually eliminate their jobs. Nevertheless,
several major financial institutions are pushing for
more innovation and larger investments in the market
centers’ automated trading systems. Second, if the mar-
ket centers went public, they might expect to overcome
existing disagreements between their members, gain
greater flexibility in decision making, and raise capital
for technological investment.
Despite these implications, ECNs feel comfortable
coexisting with traditional market centers. They indi-
cate that even if established markets were to become
more automated and agile after altering their gover-
nance structure, the new automation would still not be
as comprehensive as ECN technology. Electronic com-
munications networks expect that their nimble structure
and state-of-the-art efficiencies will enable them to
prosper even after traditional exchanges have embraced
increased automation.
Consolidation or Proliferation?
Some analysts believe that the primary activity of ECNs,
trade matching, is relatively unprofitable—particularly in
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trade matching is a business in which large economies of
scale are possible, these analysts predict that the number
of networks will eventually decline as the industry
consolidates to achieve scale economies (Ip 1999).
Other analysts, however, argue that trade matching is
not necessarily unprofitable. They contend that once an
ECN builds a customer base, it can find new products
and services to generate revenues. The uses of the net-
works extend beyond the matching of stock buyers and
sellers (Ip 1999). ECNs can earn profits by providing
market data, analytical information, and nonequity ser-
vices such as bond trading. They may also be able to use
their web sites to earn advertising revenue or sell their
technology and expertise to exchanges overseas.
Moreover, although pressures to achieve scale
economies through consolidation may emerge, the
diverse services and strategies of the existing ECNs
suggest that the networks offer sufficiently customized
products to attract a small but profitable client base. For
example, ECNs that take orders and transmit them to
the Nasdaq may obtain good returns on the routing ser-
vices they offer to a limited group of customers.
The success of such small-scale efforts provides
some basis for believing that stock trading in the future
could potentially be conducted by several intercon-
nected market centers, instead of on the floor of a single
exchange. ECNs could play a variety of roles in this
environment—displaying, routing, and executing
orders. Such an interconnected market structure would
lead to the proliferation—rather than the consolida-
tion—of ECNs.
Achieving Integration in the Securities Market
In an interconnected market environment, the way in
which orders are handled will be crucial for the contin-
ued success of ECNs. How brokers process orders
reflects their legal obligation to provide clients with
“best execution.” Best execution primarily means secur-
ing the most favorable prices available, but it also refers
to the speed of execution and other considerations. In
this respect, the Intermarket Trading System and other
methods of market interconnection enable a broker to
identify the best price for clients by investigating
whether the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, the
regional exchanges, or the OTC market offers this price.
Many practitioners believe that the current level of
market interconnection and price transparency is insuffi-
cient to achieve a truly competitive market.8 In addition to
stressing the technological and administrative limitations
of the Intermarket Trading System, they point to ECN
operations and other arrangements in which brokers clear
trades internally as practices that fragment the market and
lead to price variation among dealers.
In this vein, several market participants indicate that
integration in the securities market cannot be complete
unless a virtual “central limit-order book” is created.
Such a book would pull together electronically all limit
orders and quotes displayed internally in the various
exchanges, executing limit orders on a first-come, first-
served basis. By ensuring full interaction of all orders, the
book would lead to competition among orders, rather than
among order handlers. The central limit-order book
would be visible to everyone, allowing investors to evaluate
liquidity across the markets more effectively.
Yet other market participants suggest that a central
limit-order book could restrain competition from ECNs
and other market centers, because all trades would ulti-
mately be displayed and executed by the central mecha-
nism. A monolithic central mechanism, they argue,
might discourage those with new ideas for market inter-
connection and price transparency.
Accordingly, some participants suggest that other
ways to interconnect markets may achieve the benefits
of the central limit-order book without stifling the abil-
ity of new firms to compete for orders. For example,
they observe that ECNs using outbound routing provide
a means for orders to be quickly directed to the market
center with the best price or likelihood of execution.
Furthermore, destination-only ECNs in some cases pro-
vide full transparency of the limit orders received in
their system, allowing investors to assess the likelihood
of receiving a good price at these ECNs and to route their
orders to the best market center. The most optimistic
scenarios suggest that some combination of outbound
routing and transparency in order information could
achieve many of the benefits of a central limit-order book.
Whether such an outcome is likely, however, remains an
open question.
Conclusion
Electronic communications networks are redefining the
U.S. equity markets. While established market centers
are seeking to maintain their edge chiefly by investing
in new technology and trading systems, ECNs appear
confident that they have the automated capabilities to
be major players in the new electronic environment.
This confidence is borne out by the ECNs’strong dollar
share of Nasdaq trading volume.
Nevertheless, a potential drawback arising from the
growth of ECNs is the risk that multiple trading platforms
will fragment the market, leading to situations in which
the pricing of securities varies from one market center to
the next. To solve this problem, some market participants
stress that market centers must be interconnected.
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Accordingly, they have suggested the creation of a cen-
tral limit-order book, in which all limit orders and
quotes from different market centers can interact.
Others contend that the ECNs themselves might be a
force for, rather than against, market integration. In this
view, outbound routing and the full transparency of
limit orders achieved by some networks could bring
about an interconnected market as effectively as a central
limit-order book.
Overall, it is too early to predict exactly how the
revolution brought about by ECNs will reshape the
equity markets. In our judgment, however, the competi-
tion spawned by these vehicles is already encouraging
faster order execution, lower prices, and better customer
service. Moreover, the innovative and diverse methods
used by ECNs to set stock prices and locate the best
market center for settling a trade should continue to
have wide-ranging customer appeal.
Notes
1. ECNs rely on algorithms—essentially a mechanical set of
rules—to route orders to dealers and execute trades.
2. Liquidity is the ability to buy or sell an asset quickly and at a
price not substantially different from the prices of previous transac-
tions, assuming no new information is available.
3. Nine ECNs were registered with the Nasdaq in January 2000:
Archipelago, Attain, Brut, B-Trade, Instinet, Island, NexTrade,
Redibook, and Strike (Brut and Strike have announced merger plans).
4. An operating margin can be defined as profits before deprecia-
tion, interest, and taxes as a percentage of revenues. 
5. Although ECNs guarantee trader anonymity, disproportionate
use of the networks by institutional investors could lead to higher
information costs for uninformed liquidity providers. In this case,
the benefits of anonymity might be reduced.
6. In a call market, buy and sell orders are gathered for a period and
aggregated at one time for simultaneous execution at one price.
7. See Sarkar and Tozzi (1998) for a discussion of electronic trad-
ing on futures exchanges.
8. The various viewpoints in this section are summarized from the
testimony reported in U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs (2000).
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